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The Dog and the Wolf: 
Some Thoughts On Biological Shackles and. the Trap of Humanism 
by Craig Naherniak· 
Discouraged af~er an unsuccessful day of hunting, a hungry Wolf came on 
a well-fed Mastiff. He could see that the Dog was having a better time of it than he 
·was and he inquired what the Dog had to do to stay so well fed. "Very little," said 
the Dog. "Just drive away beggars, guard the house, show fondness to the master, 
be submissive to the rest of the family and you are well fed and warmly lodged." 
The Wolf thought this over carefully. He risked his own life almost daily, 
had to stay out in the worst of weather, and was never assured of his meals .. He 
thought he would try another way of living. 
As they were going along together the Wolf saw a place around the Dog's. 
neck where the hair had worn thin. He asked what this was and the Dog said it was 
nothing, "just the place where my collar and chain rub." The Wolf stopped short. 
"Chain?" he asked. "You me.an you are not free to go where you choose?" "No," 
said the Dog, "but what does that mean?" "Much," answered the Wolf as he trotted 
off. "Much." 1 
There are many different themes running through 
this Aesop fable which are applicable to trends in 
Western culture. One way to interpret this piece 
is to think of the Wolf as representing . "wildness" 
and the Dog as representing "domestication. "2 The 
collar and chain that rub around the neck of the 
Dog are like our own tie to the , Western techno-
. logical mind-set. It _appears that the Dog is living 
a comfortable, safe, easy life, just as we feel that 
the benefits of our technological world have brought 
us a similar security. The Wolf, i~ choosing not to 
accept the collar and chain of the Dog, maintains 
the freedom to follow . his own will and purpose. 
He retains his wildness. The Dog has had this 
wHdness, this independent purpose, bred out of him 
by the Master. His purpose is not his own, but that 
of the Master. We, in Western culture, tend to see 
ourselves as like the Master, possessing control 
over what purpose the rest of nature will serve for 
us. We fail to recognize that, nature, like the 
Wolf, has purpose independent from us. We also 
fail to recognize that ·the very mechanisms and 
techniques which we . use to exert control, have 
placed us in the position, not of Master, but of the 
Dog. The trap of .humanism, therefore, is that in 
attemptin~ to domesticate nature, we domesticate 
ourselves. · 
Wildness is everything opposite to what we 
consider civilization: it is the untamed, the 
undomesticated and that which is not controlled. In 
this sense, wildness is understood as the absence of 
human control. A wild animal is a creature with its 
own intrinsic volition, beyond any humanly defined 
purpose. While wild animals have come to sym-
bolize such human qualities as freedom, innocence 
and courage, it is important to recognize that 
wildness is also part of our biological heritage. 
Humans, too, have sprung from the. spontaneous 
integration of genetic information that forms new 
unique beings, and which characterizes . wildness . 
The constant change, through reproduction, in a 
constantly changing environment is what provides 
both the diversity and the stability of all life forms 
on the planet.. In other words, despite our culture's 
tendency to see humans as different and separate 
from wild nature, . we are continuous with it. 
From our poshion of perceived separation from 
riature, we extol 'the virtues of freedom arid 
independence associated with wildness. Yet at a 
cultural level, to ensure our survival we seem to 
have been working on ways . to minimize risk and 
extend control over society, and ourselves. Writer 
and naturalist John A. Livingston has described the 
development of this mechanism of control as a 
cultural "domestication" process. 
It .is Livingston's contention that long before 
we began t9 physically domesticate plants and 
animals, humans had alr~ady become ps-ychological-
ly domesticated through technological dependence 
and the cultivation of sophisticated techniques of 
social control, in the form of rituals, customs, 
regulations, and codes of varying description.• To 
sustain control over our lives and our growing 
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populations, we gave up the biological mechanisms 
of social regulation which still characterize the rest 
of nature. We suppressed our wildness and 
replaced it with techniques of social management. 
By doing so, Livingston argues, we were "forced to 
suspend (and eventually forgot altoge~er) the 
mutualistic non-competitive, peaceful social order 
from which [humans] had come. "5 The techniques 
humans developed for maintaining social control 
became the very fabric out of which civilization was 
woven. 
· Simplified as this accoun~ may be,. in retr:o-
spect we can easily see the mcrease m human 
dependence on technology, accompanied by the 
deepening · of the perceived separation between 
humans and the rest of the natural world. This has 
not occurred to the same degree in all human 
cultures, but is presently epitomized by ind~strial 
societies. According to Abbe Mowshowitz, a 
computer science professor from the University of 
British Columbia, . our human dependence on 
technology has led t? technology bec~.mi~g the 
mediator of all expenence. He says: It IS not 
simply the use of machine~ and gadgets th~t defines 
this dependence. Our reliance on them IS merely 
the outward manifestation of a pervasive attitude 
toward experience. 116 All experience, he believes, 
has become a commodity. He says, "the ability to 
grasp what i~ real is a~tenuated by th~ interposi~ion 
of interpretive media, by excessive filtenng, 
blocking, and laundering of experience. To the 
extent that we inhibit the capacity to interact with 
the world on a direct basis, we risk a one-sided and · 
faulty vi~w of reality and ultimately bec~me 
maladaptive. "7 Technology becomes not JUSt 
something we use for survival, but becomes 
technique--a mind-set for looking at and interpreting 
the world (like a pair of coloured glasses). 
Mowshowitz uses examples· from science 
fiction to demonstrate both the consequences of 
human technological dependence, and the "inherent 
contradiction in the conquering spirit ofscience and 
technology. "8 His conclusion is that in extending 
our dominion over the natural world we have 
alienated ourselves from the sources of our own 
vitality. "Through obsessive exercise of the will to 
power in the elaboration of technique,~ he says, 
"will itself became enfeebled and subject to control 
by autonomous forces link~d to me~ha~ical pr?g-
ress .... A social order built of this 1mperat1ve 
ultimately domesticates the heroiC impulse. which 
fashions it. "9 In other words, by creatmg an 
elaborate technological infrastructure aimed at 
making humans more free (to enjoy life), we have 
paradoxically ended up becoming enslaved by this 
technological miild;.;set. The result is less freedom 
of will and more centralization of control. But, 
does the control we humans like to think .we have 
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really exist? Christopher Hodder-Williams, author 
of Fistful of Digits,. thinks not: 
Eventually the mechanical interlock of technology 
must conquer. all individual will. You might 
conceivably postpone it, but it could only be 
postponement, because for as long as ~an cou.ld 
not stand by himself and rely on h1mself m 
preference to the easy way out, then inevitably he 
would wind up handing over the mastery of his 
own wits ... [~ic] 10 
Though Hodder-Williams does not directly· say so, 
he hints that the domestication of humans through 
dependence on technology and . social order event-
ually causes th~ loss of individual will, whic.h. is the 
one thing the so-called control and stability of 
technological society were supposed to grant us. 
For the sake of comfort and security the Dog 
gave up its ·own will to that of its master. So too, 
we give up our will to that of the cult~r~l techn.o-
logical machine we have created. .BY ~1vmg up It.s 
will and independence, the Dog relinquishes purs?It 
of its own teleology. (In the case of the Dog, Its 
teleology has been relinquished biologicall~, 
through breeding.) Its teleology, or purpose, ts 
now that of the Master. .In a way, the Dog be-
comes a technology whose purpose is to guard the 
house and show fondness to its Master. 
If we can associate the loss of will to the 
surrendering of purpose, then the next questio~ is, 
what is purpose? And, where do.es purpose reside? 
I will avoid discussing the possibility of purpose on 
a cosmic level. That there exists some omnipotent 
entity predetermining evolutionary direction can not 
be supported beyond faith. Job~ Livin~sto~ su~­
gests that there is no "purpose of this kmd m 
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· nature--at least no purpose that humans are capable 
of knowing. He suggests that "random genetic and 
environmental events brought us to a stage at which 
our minds, and thus our cultures took over, "11 and 
that prior to this all change was accidental and 
random. 
Another way to think of purpose is at the level 
of the individual, where it can be thought of as 
residing in all beings--at least in the sense that each 
organism has its own teleology, whether it is 
conscious of it or not. Paul Taylor, in Respect for 
Nature, reaffirms the idea that each individual 
.organism has its own purpose (which can be as 
simple as sustaining life): 
We conceive of the organism as a teleological 
centre of life, striving to preserve itself and 
realize its good in its own unique way. To say 
it is a teleological centre of life is to say that its 
internal functioning as well as its external 
activities are all goal orientated, having the 
constant tendency to maintain the organism's 
existence through time and to enable it success-
fully to perform those biological operations 
whe.reby it . reproduces its kind. and continually 
adapts to changing envil:onmental events and 
conditions. 12 
Every Jiving thing has being in and of itself. 
In this sense, it has purpose. Its purpose is in-
herent in its being, otherwise it would not be here, 
in nature--the conglomeration of everything being. 
There is no need for humans to know and under-
stand purpose for it to exist. However, not know-
ing is irritating to .the Western rationalist who, by 
cultural tradition, feels compelled to equate all 
purpose in tenps of human use value. The pur-
pose-to-humans-only view is what prevails in pres-
ent society. 
Hans Jonas, in The Imperative of Responsi-
bility, discusses the same topic of individual pur-
pose by showing the effects of having purpose 
reside solely in humans.13 His discussion of the 
way humans try to control the elements of nature to 
fashion technologies or tools for their pwn use 
helps illustrate the humanistic .ideology that per-
meates our conception of purpose. The end or 
purpose of a tool (or machine) belongs, Jonas 
argues, to the concept of the tool, and this con-
cept, as with all artifacts, preceded the tool's 
existence and is the cause of its origination. The 
tool, a hammer in Jonas' example, does not have a 
purpose in and of itself. The concept of .what a 
hammer might be underlies the object itself. The 
hammer did not exist before the concept of the 
hammer existed. The concept of time measure-
ment, for example, was the inspiration for the 
clock, and the clock is totally defined by this end. 
It is its only reason for being. The end of the clock 
is not, however, located in the clock, but in it's 
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maker, and this is also true of· any machine. 
Neither the hammer nor the clock have any purpose 
in and of themselves; their purpose is only in their 
use within a particular cultural context. And so it 
is true for all lifeless implements of human manu-
facture. These implements can be anything from 
simple tools to abstract institutions. Both the tool 
and the institution are artifacts created to serve the 
maker's purpose. 
Even nature, as a whole, is made over as an 
institution in the Western mind. The same 
reasoning we use to Greate social institutions we 
apply to nature in deciding what the intended use of 
the non-human is. With nature, we analyze the 
physical appearance and interpret a use for us. We 
·see nature's purpose as providing us with resources 
and we develop a set of processes for the use of 
them. Stripped of its own being, nature becomes 
thought of as II our environment. II It is considered 
an II institution," which has its use defined by our 
purposeful desires. The ramifications of this 
egocentric view are growing now that genetic 
engineering has brought our technological society to 
the threshold of controlling all life processes. 
Over the centuries, the one level the human 
domestication process could not touch was that of 
the genes. Reproduction, the way living things 
transmit genetic information from one generation to 
the next, has always been the only way new life 
forms could emerge. The random genetic fluctu-
ations in the offspring further ensures that change 
--the one constant of all life--continues!4 This 
evolutionary process is extremely slow however, 
and evolution does not always create the kind of life 
forms humans find useful; therefore, we have 
learned to control nature with .selective breeding. 
While yielding predictable results,. selective 
breeding has limitations. There still remains room 
for random natural mutation. Also, selective 
breeding is limited by the natural limit of the range 
of variation within a particular species beyond 
which severely mutated offspring cannot survive. 
Further, we always had to wait until the offspring 
were born, or sprouted, before we would know if 
the trait bred for was indeed passed on. 
Now, the human practice of genetic engineer-
ing has the potential to remove the randomness of 
genetic changes. In place of randomness, genetic 
engineering promises exact predictability and 
control of the genetic structure of life forms, by 
manipulating their DNA. Geneticist David Suzuki 
explains that: 
Until now, the power to determine the fate of 
individual genes in living things has, with rare 
exceptions, resided in nature. Evolution tends to 
rid populations of orga·nisms possessing 
detrimental genetic traits at a ponderously slow 
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pace. But today we are rapidly assembling the 
technological tools not only to render quick 
judgments concerning the "genetic worth • of 
DNA sequences ·but also to impose those 
judgments by modifying the information stored in 
genetic molecules.15 
By altering the DNA of an individual life form, 
whether by selective breeding or genetic engi-
neering, the individual's teleology can be altered at 
the organism's genetic structural level and replaced 
with human purpose. The science of genetic engi-
neering simply takes the guess work out· of 
domesticati'on. 
The idea that d-omestication makes nature into 
technologies to be used for human purpose becomes 
realized literally through genetic engineering. An 
organism's very essence, ·its DNA, cannot only be 
altered, but engineered to our exacting specifica-
tions. Through the process of cloning, for 
example, we are now able to take a cell from a 
microorganism, couple it with another piece of 
DNA, insert this cell into a host animal so that it 
will propagate, and "harvest" the cloned enzymes 
that are produced. In this way, organisms acquire 
novel genetic properties that would not be attainable 
through conventional breeding or natural mutation. 
Other possibilities include using the stomachs of 
animals to manufacture chemicals or drugs in 
quantities previously unheard of. In an .article 
entitled "Transgenic Animals Make Drugs in their 
Milk," Andrew Pollack describes this undertaking: 
Scientists are reporting their first successes in 
genetically transforming animals so that they can 
produce drugs and other useful substances in 
their mill<. Although in the early stages of 
development, it could one day turn farm animals 
into living factories, producing pharmaceuticals, 
industrial enzymes and food additives.16 
This proces·s effectively turns the cow into a living 
machine whose sole purpose is to produce drugs for 
humans. 
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The biotechnology company, Integrated Gen-
etics Inc., is bioengineering mice so that their milk 
contains a drug useful in treating human heart 
problems. Likewise, researchers in Edinburgh are 
inserting into sheep the genes needed for the pro-
duction of two human proteins that could be used as 
drugs for the treatment of human diseases. The 
advantages of having animals produce th_ese sub-
stances is that costs are substantially reduced. As 
one biologist remarks, "What is your input: grass 
and hay." Also, if more of the substance is needed, 
. then it is simply a matter of breeding more ani-
mals, 17 of essentially building more machines. 
As the science of genetic engineering becomes 
perfected, more and more complex substances can 
be produced in anima~s for human use. This type 
of "molecular farming" is just one of the ways 
applied genetic engineering is being realized. 
Another aspect of genetic engineering is the cre-
ation of entirely new creatures that are genetic 
recombinations of creatures that would normally be 
unable to reproduce naturally. One example is the 
"geep," a combination of a goat and a sheep.18 
These new life forms can even be patented like any 
other new "technologies." 
One of the next applications of genetic 
engineering will likely be the removal of "negative" 
traits in humans. Currently, genetic engineers are 
mapping the human DNA in order to discover 
which particular gene regulates which specific 
trait. 19 What is at stake may, however, be more 
than just the ethical considerations sur-rounding the 
decision of what is a "negative" or "positive" trait. 
If and when we begin to apply technological prac~ 
tices to the formation of the human we will have 
crossed a line that has never been traversed before. 
If we understand engineering to· mean the designing 
and constructing of complex material artifacts for 
human use, including the redesigning of existing 
designs for adaptation or improvement, then 
applying engineering techniques to the human 
genetic code means turning humans into the same 
category of artifact (that we reduce the non-human 
world to). Thus, everything in the world becomes 
an artifact, an object. This, Jonas argues, makes 
the human subject, not a means, but "a thing merely 
to be acted upon. "20 Human evolutionary change 
then becomes determined not by the chance integra-
tion of genetic traits (governed by adaptive 
mechanisms rooted in relationship with nature), but 
rather by the direct physical intervention of humans 
whose understanding of what traits are desirable or 
undesirable is rooted in a narrow, culturally fabri-
cated understanding of the place of humans in · 
nature. In other words, future humans become 
artifacts whose purpose resides in past generations. 
We in Western society maintain a view that 
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humans are the subjects and "nature" is the object 
of our technological mastery. In this view. humans 
are the mediators, the appliers, the purposeful 
linkers of technology onto nature in order for the 
non-human to serve our ends. Humans are ethically 
out of bounds for technological manipulation 
because they are considered to have purpose of their 
own. Western society has always considered there 
to be a clear division between humans and 
technology, or artifacts. Now that the science of 
genetic engineering has made it theoreticaJJy 
possible for technological application to be· applied 
to humans, this may change. 
Right now we have a sense of belonging to a 
humanity in which we see all purpose residing. 
But, after several generations of engineered humans 
--that is, humans with pre-determined characteris-
tics--where will the goal or realm of purpose lie? 
It seems that purpose will be defined forever by the 
previous generation and there will be no opportunity 
for adaptation from these pre-ordained characteris-
tics, since the unique potential of each person will 
have been limited. The random genetic fluctuations 
that Livingston maintains are the one constant of all 
life will have been removed. Humans will have 
become domesticated, not just culturaJJy, but very 
possibly, physically as well. Our "collar and 
chain" will be engineered right in. The possibility 
of engineering social control in humans will become 
reality. 
If, as Livingston maintains, human history is 
one of furthering the domestication process in order 
to preserve social control, then genetic engineering 
is the final solution to the unpredictability and 
irrationality of all nature. In the process, humans 
will have become a product of the same technologi-
cal applications that we enact on nature. There will 
no longer be any "wildness~ within or without (nor 
will there be any "Wolf" to remind us of what has 
been lost). At least this is the direction we are 
headed if we take the domestication process to its 
logical conclusion. The biggest proof that our 
assumptions about human control are flawed is that 
they are self-defeating. Instead of technology being 
used to free humans, it will have imprisoned 
humans within a biological ·heritage designed by 
previous generations, and hence the domestication 
process will have been completed. 
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